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Canada as a separate but dominated country has done about as well
under the U.S. as women, worldwide, have done under men; about
the only position they've ever adopted toward us, country to
country, has been the missionary position, and we were not on top.
I guess that's why the national wisdom vis-ai-vis Them has so often
taken the form of lying still, keeping your mouth shut, and
pretending you like it.... Our national animal is the beaver....
noted for its industry and its co-operative spirit. In medieval
bestiaries it is also noted for its habit, when frightened, of biting off
its own testicles and offering them to its pursuer. I hope we are not
succumbing to some form of that impulse.
-Canadian writer Margaret Atwood on capitulating to the
inundation of American popular culture'
[T]elevision is just another appliance. It's a toaster with pictures.
-Former FCC Chair Mark Fowler2
There is a substantial governmental and First Amendment interest
in promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple
technology media.
-U.S. Congress, Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992'
1. ROBERT FULFORD, BEST SEAT IN THE HOUSE 188 (1988) (quoting from Atwood's
testimony before a parliamentary committee on free trade).
2. Bernard D. Nossiter, Licenses To Coin Money: The F.C.C.'s Big Giveaway Show, 240
NATION 402,402 (1985) (quoting Mark Fowler).
3. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 2(a)(6), 106 Stat. 1460, 1461 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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I. INTRODUCTION
"Culture," it is said, "is one of the two or three most complicated
words in the English language." 4 The recurring confrontations between
Canada and the United States over works of popular culture are a vivid
illustration of culture's complexity.5 To Canadians, pop culture works are a
space for Canadians to express their views, experiences, and aspirations.
Canadians view that cultural space as integral to nourishing and preserving
a national identity that consciously defines itself by its differences from the
United States. Margaret Atwood's statement, quoted above, expresses an
extreme version of the Canadian view that the deluge of American cultural
works in Canada is a direct and serious threat to Canadian cultural
industries and, by extension, to Canadian identity and sovereignty.6 For
Americans, whose perspective is shaped by a history of liberal markets and
an ingrained suspicion of governmental measures that limit speech, the
asserted connection between protecting popular culture and Canadian
sovereignty is hard to swallow. Mark Fowler's statement likening television
to "a toaster with pictures" illustrates the most extreme American position
on works of popular culture-that the market, not the government, should
dictate how and whether these products are disseminated.7 While
Americans often treat the notion of a distinct Canadian national identity
with less respect than it deserves, there is a reciprocal failure by many
Canadians to understand the important roles that free speech and free
markets have in the lives of U.S. citizens.
4. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY 87
(1983). I do not mean "culture" in the anthropological sense of'"a given people's particular set of
preferences, predispositions, attitudes, objectives, goals; its particular way of perceiving, feeling,
thinking, and reacting to objective reality." Raymond Gagnd, French Canada: The
Interrelationship Between Culture, Language, and Personality, in CANADIAN HISTORY SINCE
CONFEDERATION 521, 525-26 (Bruce Hodgins & Robert Page eds., 1972). Rather, I am referring
to "the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity." WILLIAMS, supra, at
90.
5. The debate is rarely over "high" culture-painting, sculpture, literature, opera, and the
like. It is over mass-produced "popular" culture-film, television, music, mass-market books,
and mass-market periodicals. This is where the money is truly at stake on both sides. Oliver R.
Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free Trade, National Identity, and
Canada's Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 203, 210 (1998). In this Note,
all references to culture should be understood to be referring to this contentious "pop culture"
subset.
6. For a more systematic elaboration of that argument, see FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS, STRONG
AND FREE: CANADA AND THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY (1996), which argues that a strong culture is
essential to Canadian national security; and infra text accompanying notes 58-63.
7. Mark Fowler's toaster comment reflected the general temperament of the FCC during the
Reagan Administration. It was at that time that the FCC repealed the "fairness doctrine," a
measure that imposed restrictions on a broadcaster's speech in the interest of increasing the
diversity of views expressed on broadcast television. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public
Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 507 (2000). The U.S. Supreme Court had upheld those rules
sixteen years earlier in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969).
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Over the past century, Canadian policies attempting to mitigate the
alleged harms of an inundation of American pop culture products have
assumed two forms: those that aim to promote indigenous Canadian mass
culture through subsidies, and those that aim to protect existing Canadian
cultural industries by using tariff barriers and Canadian content rules. The
protective policies have drawn the ire of the United States for two related
reasons. First, the American government regards such measures as
primarily economic-not cultural-protectionism that violates Canada's
international trade obligations. Second, because Canada's protective
policies have the purpose and effect of restricting speech on the basis of
content, Americans view the Canadian government's intervention in that
area as particularly invidious.
This Note examines the competing Canadian and American
perspectives on protective regulations of magazines and cable television,
with an emphasis on the constitutional freedom of expression jurisprudence
of each country. I observe that Canadian and American free expression
principles coincide with each nation's political position on content-based8
regulation of popular culture. I also observe, however, that despite their
continual hostility toward Canadian protective regulations, American
lawmakers themselves employ arguably content-based rules to protect
local, distinct culture when those voices are threatened by outside
influences. Praising the cultural and educational value of local broadcast
television stations, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992,9 requiring cable providers to carry
local broadcast signals. Though the United States Supreme Court held that
Congress had a content-neutral objective, I argue that Congress's actual
intention was analogous to the Canadian drive to protect the idiosyncratic
conversations of a small community from an onslaught of influences of a
much larger one. Thus, while arguing abroad that popular culture works
should be treated merely as ordinary commodities, the United States relies
on a conceit of content-neutrality at home to privilege local culture.
The divergence between America's international position on culture
and its protective measures at home exposes the myth of the United States
as a paragon of cultural free trade. These contrary positions ought to be
reconciled. Rather than adopting the extreme position that pop culture
goods are ordinary commodities, the United States Trade Representative
8. Except where indicated otherwise, I adopt the American connotations of 
' content-based"
and "content-neutral" throughout. Generally, if one must consider the meaning of what a person
says to decide whether she has violated a rule, that rule is content-based. A rule that restricts
expression without regard to the content expressed is content-neutral. E.g., Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). For an explanation of the Canadian concept of content-
neutrality, see infra text accompanying notes 92-96.
9. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
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(USTR) ° should acknowledge the special value Americans themselves
ascribe to pop culture works and be more willing to accommodate the
efforts of other nations to preserve their own cultural industries.
I present an overview of the Canadian content-based protective
measures for magazines and television in Part II. Part III explores the
Canadian and American national myths that underlie those nations'
competing visions of the role and importance of popular culture. Canadian
courts have never considered whether Canada's content-based pop culture
discrimination infringes the guarantee of freedom of expression in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Section IV.A concludes that
were the issue to come before the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court
would probably uphold Canada's protective measures as a reasonable
means of preserving Canada's visage culturel.
In the American constitutional vernacular, Canada's protective
regulations seek to advance an interest in the "'dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources." ' 2 Section IV.B
determines, on the basis of current American constitutional doctrine, that
the Canadian protective regulations would not be upheld were the issue
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.
While Canadian-style protective regulations would not pass
constitutional muster in the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has
upheld a congressional statute with a similar (though less explicit) purpose
in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.3 In that case, cable providers
challenged a statute requiring them to provide local broadcast stations to
their subscribers, often in favorable channel positions. Those "must-carry"
rules are analogous to Canada's protective cultural regulations in that both
seek to protect works produced by a small community against a deluge of
content from outside sources. Part V argues that the conception of popular
culture as a valuable repository of local community perspectives most
plausibly underlies Congress's motives in enacting the must-carry rules.
Accordingly, the USTR should refine its international position on pop
10. The cabinet member responsible for developing policies regarding trade disputes with
Canada is the U.S. Trade Representative. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR's Role,
at http://www.ustr.gov/about-ustr/ustrrole.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). Part of the Executive
Office of the President, the USTR is "the President's principal trade advisor, negotiator, and
spokesperson on trade and related investment matters." Id.
11. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the Canadian analogue of the American
Bill of Rights. Section 2(b) of the Charter guarantees freedom of expression. CAN. CONST.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 2 ("Everyone has the
following fundamental freedoms: ... freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication .... ").
12. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 663 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S.
1, 20 (1945)).
13. 512 U.S. 622.
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culture to match Congress's efforts to preserve a distinct visage culturel in
America.
II. CANADIAN PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR TELEVISION AND MAGAZINES
No one denies the widespread presence of American pop culture in
Canada. Despite its relatively small size, Canada remains the most
important export market for U.S. pop culture. In 1989, sales of U.S. books
to Canada represented 39.9% of all U.S. books sold abroad.14 Even more
remarkable, 78% of all U.S. magazines sold abroad are sold in Canada. 5
On the other hand, only 19% of the English-language magazines and 55%
of the books Canadians read are of Canadian origin.'6 Canada is also the
largest per capita consumer and the second-largest absolute consumer of
U.S. movies.'7 Additionally, sales of U.S. television programs in Canada
earn approximately US$125 million per year. 8 Contrarily, only 3-6% of the
screen time in Canadian theaters 9 and 39% of the television programming
in Canada ° qualify as Canadian content.
Though nearly every country is penetrated by American mass media to
some degree, Canada's situation is unique for several reasons. First, seventy
percent of the Canadian population shares a primary language with
Americans, thus facilitating Canadian absorption of U.S. cultural exports."
Second, eighty percent of the Canadian population lives within sixty miles
of the U.S. border, making American print publications easy to obtain.22
That proximity also enables Canadians to receive American television
broadcast stations and Canadian cable companies to carry American cable
stationsY.
Canada's most protective cultural policies have always been its rules
regarding U.S. periodicals. 4 In 1929, the combined sales in Canada of four
major American magazines were more than double the sales of the four
14. John Herd Thompson, Canada's Quest for Cultural Sovereignty: Protection, Promotion,
and Popular Culture, in NAFTA IN TRANSITION 393, 399 (Stephen J. Randall & Herman W.
Konrad eds., 1995). Great Britain is in a distant second place, purchasing 8% of total U.S. book
exports. Id. at 399 n.21.
15. Id. at 399. Again, Great Britain ranks second in this regard, purchasing 5% of all U.S.
magazine exports. Id. at 399 n.21.
16. CULTURAL INDUS. SECTORAL ADVISORY GROUP ON INT'L TRADE, CANADIAN CULTURE
17. Id.
18. Thompson, supra note 14, at 399.
19. CULTURAL INDUS. SECTORAL ADVISORY GROUP ON INT'L TRADE, supra note 16.
20. Dep't of Can. Heritage, Introduction: Making Room for Canada's Voices, at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/culture/reportHTM2.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
21. Thompson, supra note 14, at 395.
22. Id.
23. See Amy E. Lehmann, Note, The Canadian Cultural Exemption Clause and the Fight To
Maintain an Identity, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 187, 193-94 (1997).
24. Thompson, supra note 14, at 396.
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leading Canadian magazines.2" Seeking to prop up the floundering
Canadian periodicals industry, publishing entrepreneurs and a "nationalist
intelligentsia" that found U.S. mass culture to be a menace to Canadian
values lobbied Parliament to enact a tariff on foreign publications. 6 The
Conservative government of the time responded by imposing Canada's first
tariff on periodicals in 1931.27 Subsequently, sales of the five leading
Canadian magazines rose by about sixty percent during the next four years,
and U.S. magazine circulation in Canada fell by approximately the same
amount.28
In 1965, Tariff Code 9958 was enacted.29 It prohibited U.S. media
companies from importing "special editions" of their periodicals to
Canada. A "special edition" (also called a "split-run edition") is a version
of a magazine-published originally in another country-with essentially
the same substantive content as the original, but with more than five percent
of its ads targeted to Canadians and not appearing in other versions of that
issue.3° Publishers of split-runs recover their editorial costs through sales of
ads in their home markets. This enables them to compete at an advantage
with Canadian publishers whose profitability depends on attracting ad
revenues in the Canadian market to cover editorial and production costs.3
The intended effect of Tariff Code 9958 was to prevent foreign publishers
from selling special Canadian advertising editions of what were otherwise
U.S. periodicals.3"
In 1993, Time Warner sought to exploit a loophole in that import
restriction. Instead of sending physical copies of a Canadian edition of
Sports Illustrated across the border, it transmitted the editorial content
electronically to Canadian printing facilities.33 Parliament reacted in 1995
with Bill C-103. That measure imposed a tax equal to eighty percent of all
the advertising revenue of a split-run edition, regardless of that edition's
25. Mary Vipond, Canadian Nationalism and the Plight of Canadian Magazines in the
1920s, 58 CAN. HIST. REV. 43,44 (1977).
26. Thompson, supra note 14, at 396.
27. Vipond, supra note 25, at 59.
28. Id.
29. Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Panel, WTO Doc.
WT/DS31/R (Mar. 14, 1997), reprinted in [1997] 1 WORLD TRADE ORG., DISPUTE SETrLEMENT
REPORTS 481, 484 (2000), affid in relevant part, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals, Report of the Appellate Body, WTO Doc. WT/DS3 I/AB/R (July 30, 1997), reprinted
in [1997] 1 WORLD TRADE ORG., DISPUTE SETTLEMENT REPORTS 449 (2000). Tariff Code 9958
was added to Schedule VII of the Customs Tariff. Schedule VII is executed through section 114 of
the Customs Tariff. Customs Tariff, ch. 49, § 114, 1987 S.C. 1407, 1452, 3308-10.
30. Customs Tariff, ch. 49, § 114, 1987 S.C. 1407, 1452, 3308-10.
31. Robert Eberschlag, Culture Clash: Canadian Periodical Policies and the World Trade
Organization, 26 MAN. L.J. 65, 68-69 (1998).
32. Id. at69-70.
33. Hale E. Hedley, Canadian Cultural Policy and the NAFTA: Problems Facing the U.S.
Copyright Industries, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 655, 674 (1995).
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physical origin. 4 Split-run magazines originating in Canada, however, were
exempt from the tax. 3' The Canadian government argued that Bill C-103
was necessary to ensure the survival of fora for Canadian editorial and
cultural content.36
The American government responded to Canada's discriminatory
practices by invoking the WTO dispute settlement process. In that venue,
the United States challenged not only Bill C-103, but also Tariff Code
9958."7 The WTO panel found that for the purposes of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, magazines are consumer goods like any
other commodity, and that both measures were inconsistent with Canada's
trade obligations.38  Canada responded by introducing the Foreign
Publishers Advertising Services Act. Also known as Bill C-55, the Act
would have had approximately the same effect as Bill C-103, though
technically it regulated advertising services rather than products. 39 The Act
was another explicit attempt to reserve a space for Canadian pop culture in
defiance of what the WTO had ruled were Canada's international trade
obligations. 4° The United States, viewing Bill C-55 as a refusal to comply
with the spirit of the WTO panel ruling, threatened to retaliate by imposing
sanctions against Canadian steel, plastics, textiles, and lumber.4 After some
negotiation, Canada agreed not to tax split-run periodicals in which
Canadian advertisements constituted less than eighteen percent of the total
ad content. Further, a split-run periodical could include a greater proportion
of Canadian ads if it set up editorial facilities and staff in Canada and
included at least fifty-one percent original content designated for the
Canadian market.42 The current rules on split-run magazines in Canada are
based on that compromise.
Different protective measures regulate Canadian television. The
Canadian Broadcasting Act, which applies to broadcast, cable, and satellite
34. An Act To Amend the Excise Tax Act and the Income Tax Act, ch. 46, § 36, 1995 S.C. at
5.
35. Peter Lichtenbaum & Selma Lussenburg, Canadian Law, 31 INT'L LAW. 477,477 (1997).
36. Id.
37. See Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Panel, supra note
29, at 483.
38. ld. at 587.
39. Foreign Publishers Advertising Services Act, ch. 23, § 3, 1999 S.C. at 4.
40. Whben Bill C-55 wa, tabled In the lIousc of Commons in October 1998, the Heritage
Minister stated that the bill's aim was to channel advertising service dollars to Canadian
publishers so that they could "produce original Canadian stories for and about Canadians." Can.
Heritage, New Advertising Services Legislation Tabled (Oct. 8, 1998), at http://www.pch.gc.ca/
newsroom/newse.cfm?Action=Display&Code=8NR098E. The Minister contended further that
"[Canadians] must insist upon our own cultural space where we can express our ideas, our values
and identity. This Act is consistent with Canada's longstanding cultural policies .... " Id
41. Valerie Lawton, Canada, U.S. End Trade Dispute: Compromise Gives Americans Share
of Domestic Magazine Market, TORONTO STAR, May 26, 1999, at Al.
42. Id. Split-run periodicals that do not meet these requirements are subject to punitive fines.
See Foreign Publishers Advertising Services Act, ch. 23, §§ 10-13, 1999 S.C. at 7-8.
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television distribution, emphasizes a need to protect Canadian cultural
values. It declares that "the Canadian broadcasting system... [is] essential
to the maintenance and enhancement of national identity and cultural
sovereignty"4 3 and that Canadian television should "safeguard, enrich and
strengthen the cultural... fabric of Canada."'  Under the current
regulations, private Canadian television broadcasters must air a minimum
of sixty percent "Canadian content" programming in a given year.45
Further, those broadcasters must devote at least half of the period between
6:00 p.m. and midnight to Canadian content programming.46 The current
rules for determining whether a program qualifies as Canadian content
involve a point system. A program that has a Canadian producer and
receives at least six of a possible ten points qualifies as Canadian content.
The rules require that either the director or the screenwriter be Canadian
(two points for each) and that either the highest-paid or the second-highest-
paid actor be Canadian (one point for each). Additionally, at least seventy-
five percent of the expenses incurred in producing the program must have
been paid to Canadians.
Of particular interest for the purposes of comparing Canadian television
regulations with American ones are the provisions relating to cable
providers. The Broadcasting Act specifies that cable providers "should give
priority to the carriage of Canadian programming services and, in
particular, to the carriage of local Canadian stations."48 Regulations
promulgated by the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications
Commission pursuant to the Broadcasting Act instruct cable providers to
"ensure that a majority of the video channels.., received by a subscriber
are devoted to the distribution of Canadian programming services."' 9
III. THE COLLISION OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES
ON FREE SPEECH AND POP CULTURE
Studies show that Canadians overwhelmingly support their
government's attempts to protect their cultural industries and that they want
to see more of their culture reflected in the mass media they consume.0 A
43. Broadcasting Act, ch. 11, § 3(l)(b), 1991 S.C. 117, 119.
44. Id. § 3(l)(d)(i), 1991 S.C. at 119.
45. Television Broadcasting Regulations, SOR/87-49, § 4(6), 121 C. Gaz. pt. I], at 336, 339
(Jan. 21, 1987).
46. Id. §§ 4(2), 4(7)(b), 121 C. Gaz. pt. I1, at 338-39.
47. Can. Heritage, Canadian Content Rules, at http://www.pch.gc.ca/culture/can-
con/can con.html (last modified Mar. 8, 2001).
48. Broadcasting Act, ch. 11, § 3(1)(t)(i), 1991 S.C. 117, 123.
49. Broadcasting Distribution Regulations, SOR/97-555, § 6(2), 131 C. Gaz. pt. II, at 3541,
3550 (Dec. 12, 1997).
50. Martin C. Glass & David M. Rhodes, Catching the Wave: Should Canada Follow the
Global Trend Toward Spectrum Auctions?, 44 MCGILL L.J. 141, 160 (1999).
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1995 survey reported that 72% of Canadians thought that strengthening
Canadian culture could facilitate national reconciliation between Quebec
and Anglophone Canada. Most believed that protecting Canadian culture
from U.S. influences and preserving a sense of cultural distinctiveness from
the United States were the most important ways the government could
strengthen Canadian culture." More concretely, another survey indicated
that 78% of Canadians supported content-based protectionist measures and
that 84% (93% in Quebec) believed the federal government should protect
Canada's cultural industries in trade negotiations.52
Canadians strongly support their government's protective cultural
measures for several reasons. First, there is a sense that Canadian cultural
works, by reflecting Canadian mores, experiences, and perspectives,
animate the contours of Canadian society. An advisory group to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade stated:
Our culture-our ideas, songs and stories-gives meaning to
who we are as Canadians. Through cultural products.., we express
ideas and perspectives, and we share stories and images that are
uniquely Canadian .... [Cultural products] help shape our sense of
identity. They add richness to our lives.
In Canadian books, magazines, songs, films and radio and
television programs, we are able to see and understand ourselves.
We develop a more cohesive society and a sense of pride in who
we are as a people and a nation. 3
One commentator argues that Canadian cultural works enable
Canadians to make more informed public choices. 4 Canadian cultural
products, having originated in a Canadian community, are a source of
information about that community. 5 Further, Canadian cultural works
provide a "meeting place" for Canadians to interact with each other and
learn about salient perspectives and experiences that surround them. "What
51. INDUS. CAN., PREPARING CANADA FOR A DIGITAL WORLD-FINAL REPORT OF THE
INFORMATION HIGHWAY ADVISORY COUNCIL ch. 5 (1997), http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/SSG/
ih01643e.html.
52. Id.
53. CULTURAL INDUS. SECTORAL ADVISORY GROUPUIN iNIL TRADE, nupFu i- te 16. L6.c
comments track the official position of the Department of Heritage. See Dep't of Can. Heritage,
supra note 20 ("Canadian culture helps us to understand and to celebrate our lives as Canadians.
[It] is the shared experience of being Canadian.").
54. DANIEL SCHWANEN, A MATrER OF CHOICE: TOWARD A MORE CREATIVE CANADIAN
POLICY ON CULTURE 9 (C.D. Howe Inst., Commentary No. 91, 1997).
55. The Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and
Sciences lauded Canadian newspapers and periodicals in 1951 as "probably the chief source of
knowledge to Canadians of their country and of one another." ROYAL COMM'N ON NAT'L DEV.
IN THE ARTS, LETTERS & SCIS., REPORT ch. V, para. 1 (1951), http:f/www.nlc-bnc.calmassey/h5-
400-e.html.
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is important," the commentator says, "is the ability to access products and
services that transmit the cultural and informational signals individuals
need to ensure their informed participation in the community." "56 According
to this view, Canadian cultural products can "'make democratic
government possible and better government probable."'"57
Canadians also support their government's protective measures because
they view pop culture as crucial to maintaining Canadian sovereignty.
Many contend that Canada's strength as a nation depends on its ability to
distinguish itself from the United States and that Canadian pop culture is
vital to that objective.58 Thus, they argue that "the presence or absence of
culture... has a direct bearing on the security of the state."59 As early as
1929, the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting was concerned that the
inundation of American ideas through the new medium of radio would
"'mould the minds of the young people... to ideals and opinions that are
not Canadian."' o In 1957, the Royal Commission on Broadcasting found
that while Canadians could have cheaper radio and television if Canadian
stations became outlets of American networks, it would not be possible "'to
have a Canadian nation at all"' if that occurred.6' Franklyn Griffiths, a
professor of political science at the University of Toronto, argued recently
that for Canada, "defense of sovereignty comes down to our ability to
nourish the processes that hold us together as a people with purposes and a
destiny of our own .... Defense of sovereignty is, au fond, a matter of
culture."6 Culture, he said, is "utterly fundamental in securing [Canada]
against internal as well as external threats to its well-being and cohesion." 63
That Canadians value their cultural works because those works promote
community-building, dialogue, and Canadian sovereignty does not fully
explain why they support their government's protective measures. There is
significant evidence that were Canadian cultural industries not protected
from cheaper foreign imports, their economic survival would be severely
56. SCHWANEN, supra note 54, at 9.
57. TASK FORCE ON THE CAN. MAGAZINE INDUS., A QUESTION OF BALANCE I (1994)
(quoting the report of the O'Leary Royal Commission on Publications).
58. See Roger Frank Swanson, Canadian Cultural Nationalism and the U.S. Public Interest,
in CANADIAN CULTURAL NATIONALISM 55, 56 (Janice L. Murray ed., 1977) (arguing that
"Canadian cultural nationalism is grounded in a century-long quest for a national identity that
defines a Canadian 'separateness' from the United States").
59. Kevin Dowler, The Cultural Industries Policy Apparatus, in THE CULTURAL INDUSTRIES
IN CANADA 328, 337-38 (Michael Dorland ed., 1996).
60. ISAIAH LITVAK & CHRISTOPHER MAULE, CULTURAL SOVEREIGNTY 8 (1974) (quoting
the report of the Royal Commission on Radio Broadcasting).
61. Id. at 9 (quoting the report of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting).
62. GRIFFITHS, supra note 6, at 7.
63. Id. at 9. An advisory group to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade has
made similar claims, arguing that "[als countries become more economically integrated, nations
need strong domestic cultures and cultural expression to maintain their sovereignty and sense of
identity." CULTURAL INDUS. SECTORAL ADVISORY GROUP ON INT'L TRADE, supra note 16.
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threatened.64 For example, American publishers of "split-run" magazines
65
enjoy significant economic advantages over Canadian publishers, with
potentially devastating results. Having recovered the costs of their
magazine's substantive content through advertising in the much larger
American market, American publishers can sell advertising in Canada at
lower rates than their Canadian competitors.66 Since Canadian periodicals
are unable to penetrate the American market to recoup production costs in a
similar way,67 they are at a significant competitive disadvantage. The Task
Force on the Canadian Magazine Industry concluded that the effects of the
unregulated sale of American split-run magazines in Canada would be "a
downward spiral."68 Competition from split-runs would reduce the
operating profits of Canadian magazines by up to eighty-five percent. This
would cause ninety-four percent of the currently profitable Canadian
magazines to realize a zero operating profit. Moreover, those magazines
that attempted to stay in business would be forced to reduce their editorial
budget, thus reducing the quality of their content. As the number of
editorial pages decreased, circulation and profits would further decline due
to reduced editorial quality.69
Even setting aside split-run periodicals, those who import other forms
of pop culture media from much larger markets have a distinct advantage
over Canadian cultural purveyors. Creating and marketing products for the
Canadian market alone is costly because Canada's relatively small size
affords few opportunities for realizing the cost efficiencies enjoyed by
creators of content in larger markets.7" For example, one hour of prime-time
television created for the Canadian market can cost about $1 million, while
it costs only one-tenth of that amount to purchase an hour of American
drama.71 Citing these economic factors, Canadian commentators and the
Canadian government argue that the viability of Canadian cultural
64. This was one of the arguments Canada advanced before the World Trade Organization.
Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Panel, supra note 29, at 493.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31, 42.
66. Eberschlag, supra note 31, at 68.
67. See ROYAL COMM'N ON NAT'L DEV. IN THE ARTS, LETTERS & SCiS., supra note 55, ch.
II, para. 24 ("The Canadian periodical cannot... invade the American market [because]
Americans ... simply do not know enough about Canada to appreciate Canadian material.").
68. TASK FORCE ON THE CAN. MAUALINE IINDUS., supru note 57, at 55.
69. Id. at 54-55.
70. See GOV'T OF CAN., VITAL LINKS: CANADIAN CULTURAL INDUSTRIES 11 (1987);
CULTURAL INDUS. SECTORAL ADVISORY GROUP ON INT'L TRADE, supra note 16. Because
Canadian cultural products are not very popular in those larger foreign markets, Canadian content
creators are unable to realize those economies of scale. See, e.g., Liss Jeffrey, The Impact of
Technological Change on Canada's Affirmative Policy Model in the Cultural Industry and New
Media Sectors, 25 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 379, 384 (1999) (noting the difficulties of a Canadian television
station in penetrating the American market).
71. CULTURAL INDUS. SECTORAL ADVISORY GROUP ON INT'L TRADE, supra note 16. The
figure is in Canadian dollars.
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industries would be jeopardized by an unregulated influx of foreign cultural
products.72
Therefore, the special value Canadians attribute to pop culture works,
coupled with the potentially crippling economic threat Canadian cultural
industries face from foreign competition, leads Canadians to support their
government's protective cultural policies.73 Those policies aim to treat pop
culture differently in the realm of international trade. In contrast, the
overwhelming sentiment in the United States-and the position the United
States adopts in trade disputes with Canada-is that pop culture products
are merely ordinary commodities. Those sentiments are reflected in former
FCC Chairman Mark Fowler's remark that a television is nothing more than
"a toaster with pictures." "
Arguably, the U.S. position is rooted in fundamental and "widely-
shared... beliefs in the intrinsic goodness of free markets, free trade, and
free speech" that "transcend[] ... political divides." " Further, the
comparative distrust Americans feel toward government makes them
especially wary of measures that aim to restrict what individuals may
consume. The view is that an exclusionary prohibition, however dressed up,
is at least partially premised on the antidemocratic idea that individuals, left
to their own devices with a real choice, cannot be trusted to make the
"right" choice in the popular culture they consume. Additionally, few
Americans would seriously consider imported works to be a threat to
American sovereignty, due to the dominant position of the United States on
the global stage and the saturation of American life with American pop
culture products.
Furthermore, U.S. free speech doctrine holds that content-based
restrictions on speech are inherently suspect because of the strong
possibility that such measures aim to suppress particular views.76 As such,
any content-based rule must advance a compelling interest to withstand
First Amendment scrutiny. According to current U.S. constitutional
doctrine, the interest in promoting a diversity of ideas in the public sphere is
not compelling enough to justify a content-based restriction on speech.7"
Adopting this "first amendment optic," American trade officials view the
72. See, e.g., id.; Jeffrey, supra note 70, at 382.
73. Of course, some Canadians criticize their government's protective rules. Most adopt the
American complaint that these cultural protections are nothing more than venal economic
protectionism. One critic remarked: "Show me a cultural protectionist, and I'll show you
somebody with a subsidy he wants to keep. Culture is simply the garbage can lid these types use
to shield themselves from their critics." Michael Harris, Editorial, Grit Strategy Is Pulp Fiction,
TORONTO SUN, Jan. 21, 1997, at 17.
74. Nossiter, supra note 2, at 402 (quoting Mark Fowler).
75. Goodenough, supra note 5, at 205.
76. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 116 (1991); infra Section IV.B.
77. See infra text accompanying notes 130-137.
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explicit objective of privileging Canadian over foreign content as
antithetical to the fundamental First Amendment principle guaranteeing the
free flow of information." All of these factors have provoked Americans to
cast Canadian cultural nationalism as merely a "non-tariff barrier to the free
flow of goods" or as "blatant anti-Americanism." 79
IV. COMPARING FREEDOM OF SPEECH DOCTRINES
ON Pop CULTURE DISCRIMINATION
This Part examines the constitutionality of the Canadian protective
rules from Canadian and American perspectives. Perhaps not surprisingly,
the free speech doctrine in each country is consistent with the longstanding
Canadian and American positions on this matter. Though the issue has
never been litigated in Canada, the free expression doctrine in that country
suggests that Canadian courts would uphold the protective rules. The
Canadian Supreme Court has stated that the interest in preserving a distinct
French culture in Quebec--Quebec's "visage linguistique" 8 -is
compelling enough to justify a law requiring French to be the predominant
language on outdoor signs in that province." Similarly, since Canadians
consume predominantly foreign pop culture products despite their
government's protective measures, the Canadian Supreme Court would
likely hold that the interest in preserving a space for distinctly Canadian
cultural exchange would justify those rules. Conversely, the U.S. Supreme
Court would almost certainly find those same rules unconstitutional,
because it has held that the interest in promoting a diversity of views in the
public sphere is not compelling enough to justify content-based
regulations. 2 That interest in a "widespread dissemination of information
from a multiplicity of sources" may justify only a content-neutral rule.83
A. The Canadian Doctrine
Canadian magazine and broadcast rules are content-based. They
privilege Canadian works over those from other nations to achieve greater
dissemination of purportedly distinct Canadian viewpoints and ideas. One
might argue that the rules appear to discriminate only on the basis of the
geograpi -. ure of a particular work and not necessarily nn the hnsis of
its content. In support of that proposition, one could point out that a
78. Swanson, supra note 58, at 56.
79. Id.
80. See infra notes 109-110.
81. Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 780.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 130-137.
83. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-63 (1994).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20021 2301
The Yale Law Journal
Canadian program or magazine designed to emulate American culture for
an American audience would be deemed "Canadian content" while an
American work intended to adopt a Canadian outlook would not qualify.
There are several reasons, however, why the rules should be construed as
overwhelmingly privileging works on the basis of content. First, as a
practical matter, American products adopting a Canadian outlook and
targeting Canadian audiences are rare. The vast majority of the pop culture
works imported from the United States are also sold to Americans, and
because the United States is a larger market, those works are naturally
geared to Americans. In fact, the major American media companies that sell
their products in Canada wish to do so precisely because only minimal
substantive changes, if any at all, are necessary to sell those American-
geared products to Canadians.' Using a geographic restriction as a proxy
for a restriction on non-Canadian content is thus fairly accurate. Second, an
explicit goal of the protective rules is to promote Canadian conversations
and Canadian cultural exchange." The rules regard Canadians as different
from Americans in ways that are borne out in the cultural works that
Canadians produce. Thus, when viewed through the lens of Canada's
constant struggle to differentiate itself from the United States, these rules
intend to privilege the purported distinct ideas, perspectives, and
experiences of Canadians.
Given that Canada's rules have both the purpose and the effect of
restricting expression on the basis of content, it may appear surprising that
these rules have never been challenged on that basis in Canada. While there
have been several disputes in which such a challenge could have been
raised, the litigants in each case failed to raise the question properly."6 That
these regulations have never been challenged on freedom of expression
grounds, despite their explicit aim to restrict speech in a content-based
manner, is consistent with Canadian views of the importance of indigenous
pop culture.87 I argue below that were the question to come before it, the
Canadian Supreme Court would likely hold that the protective, content-
based measures pass constitutional muster.
84. When asked why his magazine was fighting to preserve its Canadian operation, a former
Time magazine editor replied: "They don't call Canada the candy store for nothing." Time
Canada Turns More Canadian, Bus. WK., Oct. 20, 1975, at 52, 52.
85. See supra Part I1.
86. See, e.g., ExpressVu Inc. v. Nil Norstat Int'l Inc., [1998] 1 F.C. 245, 269-70 (declining to
consider whether an absolute prohibition against receiving certain radio communications was a
breach of Section 2(b) because the issue was not properly raised by the parties); R. v. Knibb,
[1997] 8 W.W.R. 115, 129 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) (same). No litigant has ever challenged on freedom of
expression grounds Canada's most restrictive periodicals policies. Those policies are described
supra text accompanying notes 24-42.
87. I describe those views supra Part III.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2302 [Vol.1I11: 2289
Pop Culture Discrimination
A Canadian court evaluates a measure alleged to infringe the Charter's
guarantee of freedom of expression (Section 2(b))' 8 in two stages. First, the
court assesses whether the rule has the purpose or effect of limiting the
right to freedom of expression. If it determines that the law has that purpose
or effect, the court must determine next whether the law may be justified
under Section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 asks whether a provision that
limits a Charter right "can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." 89 If the court finds that the provision is proper despite
its limitations on speech, the provision will stand. 90 I argue below that
Canada's protectionist measures would be held to infringe Section 2(b), but
would be justified by Section 1.
According to the Canadian Supreme Court, protecting freedom of
expression is "'fundamental' because in a free, pluralistic and democratic
society we prize a diversity of ideas and opinions for their inherent value
both to the community and to the individual." 9, This explicit recognition of
the value of a diversity of ideas, and the Court's general view that the
Charter should be interpreted broadly, has caused it to hold that any activity
that conveys or attempts to convey a meaning falls within the scope of
Section 2(b).92 As a result, a Canadian court adjudicating a freedom of
expression case will almost always conclude that the impugned law
infringes Section 2(b).93 This nearly all-encompassing view of expression is
the basis of the Canadian principle of "content-neutrality." '94 The Supreme
Court has stated that although "not all expression is equally worthy of
protection," 95 all expression-regardless of its content-is nevertheless
protected under Section 2(b).96 The Court has held that considerations of the
worthiness of content are appropriate in the Section 1 analysis, but not to a
determination of whether such content is expression. Further, and unlike the
American jurisprudence in this area, the Court has found that the category
of commercial speech "do[es] not have any particular meaning or
88. Section 2(b) of the Charter reads: "Everyone has the following fundamental
freedoms: .. freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press
and other media of communication .... " CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 2(b).
89. Jd. § 1.
90. 2 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW UP CANADA ch. 40.2, .40-6 (4t cd. 19".
91. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 968; see also Retail, Wholesale & Dep't
Store Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 583 (stating that "discussion of
varying ideas" is necessary to Canadian democracy).
92. R. v. Keegstra, [19901 3 S.C.R. 697, 826; Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 969; 2 HOGG,
supra note 90, ch. 40.5(a), at 40-10.
93. 2 HOGG, supra note 90, ch. 40.2, at 40-6.
94. Recall that my use of "content-neutral" and "content-based" elsewhere refers to the
American meanings of these terms and not to the Canadian ones. See supra note 8.
95. Rocket v. Royal Coll. of Dental Surgeons, 11990] 2 S.C.R. 232, 247.
96. Keegstra, [19901 3 S.C.R. at 759-60.
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significance in Canadian constitutional law." 97 That some activity has a
commercial purpose does not "remove[] the expression contained therein
from the scope of protected freedom." 98
In summary, only activities that are "purely physical and do[] not
convey or attempt to convey meaning""9 are considered not to be
expression under the Supreme Court's expansive reading of the Charter.
Thus, there is no doubt that the materials subject to the Canadian content
regulations-magazines, television, films, music, and any advertising they
may contain-are expression protected by Section 2(b).
A court will hold that a law or regulation violates Section 2(b) if it has a
purpose or effect of restricting expression."°° Since the Canadian content
rules have both the purpose and the effect of reducing the extent of the
dissemination of non-Canadian pop culture works, and since those works
are undoubtedly expression protected by the Charter, the Court would hold
that these rules violate Section 2(b).
Whether the Canadian Supreme Court would rule that the Canadian
protective measures infringe the Charter would thus turn on a Section 1
analysis. Although there is no direct precedent in this area, I argue below
that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Ford v. Quebec' indicates that these
provisions would likely be upheld.
In Ford, the Supreme Court considered whether section 58 of the
Quebec Charter of the French Language-which required that outdoor
signs, posters, and commercial advertising be in French only-infringed the
Charter's freedom of expression guarantee.10 2 The threshold question was
whether Section 2(b) includes the freedom to express oneself in the
language of one's choice. After all, the law did not directly restrict the ideas
expressed on the signs; its requirements applied only to the language used.
The Court held that language "'is not merely a carrier of content ....
Language itself is content.'" 103 It stated that "[1]anguage is so intimately
related to the form and content of expression that there cannot be true
freedom of expression.., if one is prohibited from using the language of
one's choice." "0 Thus, the Court held that the Quebec sign law was as
much a content-based restriction as a law that restricted expression on the
basis of the viewpoints or ideas expressed. Applying the Canadian content-
97. Ford v. Quebec, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 755.
98. Id. at 766.
99. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 969.
100, R. v. Big M Drug Man Ltd., [1985] I S.C.R. 295, 331-32.
101, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.
102, Id at 721.
103, Id. at 750 (quoting JOSHUA A. FISHMAN, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LANGUAGE 4 (1972)).
104. Id. at 748.
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neutrality principle, the Court held that the sign law infringed Section
2(b). 0 5
The Court considered next whether the Quebec language restriction was
nonetheless "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society"
under Section 1.106 When Canadian courts make that inquiry, they apply the
test elaborated in R. v. Oakes."°7 The two-prong Oakes test requires a court
to determine whether the legislation bears on a "pressing and substantial
concern" and whether "the means chosen to attain [the government's]
objectives... [are] proportional or appropriate to the ends."'08 The Quebec
Attorney General argued that the objective of the French-only policy was to
ensure that the Quebec visage linguistique1°9 reflected the predominance of
French in the province. Without rules prohibiting English on exterior signs,
the Attorney General argued, Quebec's visage linguistique would give the
impression that English was as significant as French in the province. Due to
the asserted vulnerable position of the French language in Quebec and
Canada, such a false visage linguistique would reinforce the concern among
Francophones that "the French language was threatened and... would
ultimately disappear." '10 This concern, the Attorney General argued, would
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Young Francophones would infer that
the language of success and advancement was English, and Quebec
Anglophones would feel no great need to learn French. The Court held that
Quebec's interest in preserving the French visage linguistique-and thus
the viability of the French language in Quebec-was "a response to a
substantial and pressing need" " and therefore satisfied the first prong of
the Oakes test.
The Court was not convinced, however, that the sign law satisfied the
second "proportionality" prong of the Oakes test. It held that the objective
of protecting the viability of French did not require that outdoor signs be
only in French.112 The Court suggested that "whereas requiring the
predominant display of the French language, even its marked
predominance, would be proportional to the goal of promoting and
105. See id. at 766-67.
106. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms),
§ 1.
107. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138-39.
108 . v. 1) .vadss o &. A.t L td rl[198, 2 ' 1P "713, 76. Readers nmilinr with the
U.S. Supreme Court's levels of scrutiny will recognize the similarities here. For example, strict
scrutiny requires that a content-based limit on expression be "necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and... narrowly drawn to achieve that end." Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270
(1981).
109. This French phrase might be best understood as referring to the visual cues-like
billboards and stop signs-that would cause a person visiting Quebec to draw inferences about the
dominant language of the population.
110. Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 778.
111. Id. at 777.
112. Id. at 779-80.
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maintaining a French 'visage linguistique' in Quebec .... requiring the
exclusive use of French has not been so justified." 113 Therefore, the Court
overturned the Quebec sign law not because the objective was not
"pressing and substantial" -the Court found that protecting French
language and culture was a pressing and substantial concern-but because
requiring that French be the exclusive language on outdoor signs went too
far. The Court indicated further that the law would have been upheld had
the legislature merely required that French be the "marked[ly]
predominan[t]" language used. " 4
The similarities between the Quebec sign laws and the Canadian
content regulations are instructive. In both situations, governments enacted
restrictions on expression based on content. In Ford, the Court ruled that
Quebec's language restrictions were effectively restrictions on the basis of
content. Similarly, Canada's cultural regulations imposing burdens on non-
Canadian works are also content-based since they have the purpose and
effect of privileging "Canadian" ideas and perspectives over foreign ones.
Further, in Ford, the Quebec government had banned shopkeepers from
using languages other than French on outdoor signs to ensure that Quebec's
visage linguistique reflected the actual linguistic predominance of French in
Quebec. The Quebec government argued that a deterioration of Quebec's
visage linguistique would dramatically reduce the actual prevalence of
French in Quebec. Similarly, the federal government's Canadian content
rules aim to preserve Canada's visage culturel. Without limitations on
foreign (especially American) pop culture imports, the government argues,
the overwhelming presence of foreign material will "stifle... [Canadian]
creative effort[s]" 115 and contribute significantly to the ultimate demise of
Canadian culture.
In Ford, the Supreme Court found that the Quebec government's
objective of preserving the French visage linguistique was "pressing and
substantial" because of the subordinate position of the French language in
Canada relative to English. To buttress that assertion, the Court referenced
studies asserting that the threatened position of French in Canada was due
in substantial part to the relative populations of Francophones and
Anglophones in Canada.1"' That Francophones constituted a minority meant
that there was a real danger that the French language, if not protected,
113. Id. at 780.
114. Id.
115. ROYAL COMM'N ON NAT'L DEV. IN THE ARTS, LETrERS & SCIS., supra note 55, ch. 11,
para. 26.
116. According to the studies, the major factors responsible for the threatened position of the
French language in Canada were "(a) ... a decline in the Quebec francophone proportion of the
Canadian population as a whole; (b) the decline of the francophone population outside Quebec as
a result of assimilation; [and] (c) the greater rate of assimilation of immigrants to Quebec by the
anglophone community of Quebec." Ford, [1988] 2 S.C.R. at 778.
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would disappear in Canada. Similarly, one could argue that the large
disparity between the populations of Canada and the United States (the
United States has over nine times as many people as Canada does' 17) means
that a real threat to Canadian culture exists. The difference in size of the
Canadian and U.S. economies also supports the proposition that Canadian
cultural industries may not withstand an unfettered inundation of American
cultural products. This would be especially true in the split-run magazine
industry, where U.S. publishers are able to make up their substantive
editorial costs through U.S. sales and can offer advertising in Canadian
editions at a discount relative to Canadian publications.11 This perceived
threat to Canadian culture is manifested in a Department of Heritage
publication stating that "Canada's insistence on its own cultural space and
on the importance of cultural diversity has much to do with living next door
to the most powerful economic and cultural dynamo in the world." 119 Thus,
given that the Court found the threat to Quebec's visage linguistique to be
compelling, it would likely find the threat to Canada's visage culturel to be
equally so.
The Supreme Court held in Ford that the French language law did not
satisfy the proportionality prong of the Oakes test. The Court held that the
absolute ban on non-French languages was excessive because a less
restrictive law that required a "marked predominance" of French would
have successfully realized Quebec's goal. None of the Canadian content
regulations imposes an absolute ban on dissemination of or access to non-
Canadian works of popular culture. In fact, despite Canada's protectionist
cultural policies, it is foreign pop culture works that are predominant in
Canada. Even with the current restrictions in place, 81% of the English-
language consumer magazines sold in Canada-generating 63% of that
country's total circulation revenue-are foreign. 2 ° Further, 79% of retail
sales of tapes, CDs, and concerts, and 85% of film distribution revenues,
are generated by foreign works.'' Non-Canadian films also account for
between 94% and 97% of the screen time in Canadian theaters,'22 and 61%
of all television programming in Canada is of foreign origin. 23 The only
117. The population of Canada as of July 2001 was about 31 million. Statistics Can.,
Canadian Statistics-Population, Canada, the Provinces and Territories, at http://www.statcan.ca/
engllshl-crlhdro|leL~.n.....-. ... ... . htm (ln t modiied Feb. 22 9WO) The estiimated
population of the United States at that time was roughly 285 million. Population Div., U.S.
Census Bureau, Time Series of National Population Estimates: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2001, at
http://eire.census.gov/popest/datanational/populartables/table0i.php (last modified Dec. 27,
2001).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
119. Dep't of Can. Heritage, supra note 20.
120. CULTURAL INDUS. SECTORAL ADVISORY GROUP ON INT'L TRADE, supra note 16.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Dep't of Can. Heritage, supra note 20.
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area where Canadian cultural products are predominant (if by
"predominant" one means that they account for more than fifty percent of
total consumption) is books; 55% of book sales in Canada are of a
Canadian origin.t 4 Thus, Canada's protective cultural measures are not the
type of outright ban that the Court found to be disproportionate in Ford.125
Given that a rule requiring the "marked predominance" of French would
have passed constitutional muster in Ford, the Canadian content rules,
which maintain the "marked predominance" of foreign cultural products in
the Canadian market, would likely be upheld.
B. The American Doctrine
Though there is a lively academic debate in the United States about
whether promoting a diversity of ideas in the public domain is an
acceptable rationale for content-based restrictions on expression, 126 the First
Amendment doctrine has followed Justice Holmes's "marketplace of
ideas" theory.'27 That theory holds that viewpoints exist in the public
domain in much the same way as ordinary goods exist in the market. And,
just like in the market for commodities, the ideas that the majority believes
to be persuasive or true will flourish, and ideas that are thought to be
unpersuasive or foolish will be relegated to obscurity. This theory of free
speech holds that it should be the majority-and not the state-that decides
whether a viewpoint survives in the public domain. The way to counter
ideas one does not like is not to prohibit those ideas from being expressed,
but to rebut those unlikable ideas with more persuasive ones. In this way,
the view that the majority finds most persuasive will prevail. 28 The upshot
of the "marketplace of ideas" theory is that the state may, within some
constraints, subsidize speech to promote a particular idea or form of
communication. 9 The state may not, however, enact measures that restrict
124. CULTURAL INDUS. SECTORAL ADVISORY GROUP ON INT'L TRADE, supra note 16.
125. One of the objectives of the Canadian government's cultural policies is "to ensure that
Canadian cultural content is available to all Canadians-without limiting their access to foreign
cultural products." Id.
126. See, e.g., LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 133-45 (1991); Ronald W.
Adelman, The First Amendment and the Metaphor of Free Trade, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1125 (1996);
Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1987); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free
Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, The First
Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1759-65 (1995).
127. Justice Holmes was the first Supreme Court Justice to use the metaphor "free trade in
ideas" in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
128. Holmes's theory does not claim to predict that the "moral" or "true" views will prevail
over "immoral" or "false" ones. Instead, the pervasiveness of an idea will be linked to the
number of people who find it to be persuasive. In this way, his theory avoids the potentially
corrupting governmental responsibility for making determinations of morality or truth.
129. Goodenough, supra note 5, at 234.
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speech on the basis of content or viewpoint without a compelling
justification. The current constitutional doctrine in the United States holds
that the interest in increasing the diversity of the ideas in the public domain,
while important enough to justify a content-neutral regulation of speech, is
not sufficiently weighty to justify a regulation on the basis of content.
The Court's distaste for content-based measures that aim to promote a
greater diversity of ideas is evident in Miami Herald v. Tornillo 30 In that
case, the Court invalidated a "right-of-reply" statute that applied to
newspapers. If a newspaper published an article criticizing a political
candidate, the statute required that the newspaper provide him or her with
space in the newspaper-free of charge-to respond."' The asserted
purpose of the statute was to solve a market failure in the marketplace of
ideas. The government argued that economic factors had caused a large
number of metropolitan newspapers to disappear and "made entry into the
marketplace of ideas served by the print media almost impossible." '32 This
resulted in a press "that [had] become noncompetitive and enormously
powerful and influential in its capacity to manipulate popular opinion and
change the course of events."133 Thus, "[t]he First Amendment interest of
the public in being informed [was] said to be in peril because the
'marketplace of ideas' [was] a monopoly controlled by the owners of the
market." 134 The statute, by requiring that newspapers present several
perspectives on some issues, was aimed at enhancing free speech and
promoting the "'broad societal interest in the free flow of information to
the public."' 135
The Supreme Court held that the interest in ensuring that diverse
viewpoints were more widely available could not justify a content-based
restriction on speech in the press. The Court stated that "any such a
compulsion to publish that which 'reason' tells [an editor] should not be
published is unconstitutional." 136 Further, a rule requiring that a particular
article be published is a limit on expression in the same way as a rule
forbidding publication of specified matter, because it "exacts a penalty on
the basis of the content of a newspaper... in terms of the cost in printing
130. Miarm Herald Pubfl'g Co. v. Torniiio, 4i8 U.S. 241 (1974).
131. Id. at 244.
132. Id. at 251.
133. Id. at 249.
134. ld. at 251.
135. Id. at 245 (quoting Tornillo v. Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 287 So. 2d 78, 82 (Fla. 1973)
(upholding the statute)).
136. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256 (internal quotation marks omitted). The concurrence stated that
"the First Amendment erects a virtually insurmountable barrier between government and the print
media so far as government tampering, in advance of publication, with news and editorial content
is concerned." Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
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and composing time and materials and in taking up space that could be
devoted to other material the newspaper would have preferred to print." 137
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,
the Court invalidated a tax on printing materials that applied only to certain
newspapers. 3 ' A tax that applies only to the press, the Court stated,
suggests the "presumptively unconstitutional" goal of suppressing
expression. 39 That the tax applied only to certain members of the press
"presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by [the state]
can justify the scheme." 140
In light of Tornillo and Minneapolis Star, Canadian-style protective
magazine regulations would almost certainly be held unconstitutional.
Under the current protective scheme, magazines that contain less than fifty-
one percent original Canadian content and whose advertisements directed to
the Canadian market exceed eighteen percent of their total ad content are
subject to large punitive fines. 4 ' Since those penalties apply only to certain
magazines based on their content, no interest asserted by the government
could justify them under Minneapolis Star. Moreover, the fines have the
explicit purpose and likely effect of preventing magazines with particular
content from being published in Canada. Since no "'government
agency... can tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it
cannot,'" 42 those taxes would violate the Tornillo holding.
While the differences between the Canadian and American
jurisprudence in the area of magazines is interesting, a more informative
area of comparison is cable television regulation. 4 3 In 1992, Congress
137. Id. at 256 (majority opinion). The Court, however, held that even if a newspaper faced
no additional costs and would not have been forced to forego printing something else, the statute
would nevertheless be unconstitutional "because of its intrusion into the function of editors." Id.
at 258.
138. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
139. Id. at 585.
140. Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
141. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
142. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 255-56 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 400 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
143. In the television broadcast medium, the U.S. Supreme Court has permitted Congress to
make content-based regulations that have the purpose of increasing the diversity of views
available. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, the Court held that the FCC's "fairness
doctrine," some aspects of which were similar to the "right-of-reply" rules in Tornillo, was
constitutionally permissible. 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969). The Court held that the FCC rules were
justified by the scarcity of available broadcast frequencies. Because of the limited number of
broadcasters that could occupy the broadcasting spectrum, the government could condition its
licensing decisions on assurances from broadcasters that a wide range of views would be
disseminated. Id. The Court has refused to apply the scarcity rationale to other methods of
television distribution. Most importantly for the purposes of this discussion, the Supreme Court
has explicitly rejected the scarcity reasoning in the context of cable, stating that "cable television
does not suffer from the inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast medium." Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639 (1994).
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passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act,1"
which required operators of cable television systems to devote up to one-
third of their channels to local broadcast television stations. This
requirement is embodied in what are usually referred to as the "must-
carry" rules. 14- Finding that the economic power of cable television had
placed the free local broadcast television business in jeopardy, Congress
concluded that mandatory carriage is necessary to preserve local
broadcasting for households that do not subscribe to cable.'46 The must-
carry rules are, in some ways, analogous to the "right-of-reply" rule in
Tornillo. In both cases the government required a purveyor of content to
permit particular speakers to express themselves using the purveyor's
forum. Unlike the right-of-reply rule, however, the Supreme Court upheld
the must-carry rules.
The Court in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC (Turner I)
summarized Congress's asserted rationales for the rule as follows: "(1)
preserving the benefits [to nonsubscribers of cable] of free, over-the-air
local broadcast television, (2) promoting the widespread dissemination of
information from a multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair
competition in the market for television programming." '147 The majority
was convinced that Congress's overriding objective "was not to favor
programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, or format, but rather
to preserve access to free television programming for the 40 percent of
Americans without cable." " Accordingly, the majority held that the must-
carry rules were content-neutral. The appropriate inquiry, therefore, was
whether the rules "'further[] an important... governmental interest;...
and [whether] the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.""' 4 9 The Court concluded that each of Congress's asserted
rationales-including the "widespread dissemination of information from a
multiplicity of sources"-was an "important governmental interest." 50
The Court remanded the case for additional fact-finding to determine
whether the broadcast industry was actually under serious threat from the
cable industry and whether the must-carry rules were overly intrusive in
curtailing the First Amendment rights of cable providers.
Turner I highlights an important difference between the Canadian and
American cnstntitutinna apprc.hes in this area. In Canada. one of the
144. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, 106 SLat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
145. Id §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. at 1471-81 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (1994)).
146, Id § 2(a)(8)(D), (16), 106 Stat. at 1461-62 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 521).
147. 512 U.S. at 662.
148, Id. at 646.
149. Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
150. Id. at 662-63.
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important normative reasons for protecting expression is to ensure that a
diverse array of ideas is available in the public sphere.' In the United
States, the state's interest in diversity (or, using the language of the Turner I
Court, "'the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources"' "') must be balanced against the First Amendment
guarantee of free speech. The U.S. decisions indicate that the state's interest
in a diversity of ideas is considered an "important," but not a
"compelling," interest.'53 As noted above, the majority in Turner I found
that Congress's interest in diversity was an important interest that could
justify a purportedly content-neutral cable regulation. In Tornillo, the
Florida government's interest in making available a diverse set of views in
the press was not compelling enough to justify the content-based ight-of-
reply statute.
154
In Turner I, the majority's determination of content-neutrality rested
primarily on Congress's averred intent to preserve television for those who
do not subscribe to cable. Congress had found that most cable providers
operate a monopoly over cable service in their areas. If cable providers
refused to carry broadcasters' signals, the number of households that would
have access to the broadcasters' programming would decline. As fewer
viewers tuned in to broadcast television, the advertising dollars that would
otherwise have gone to broadcast stations would be redirected to cable
television stations. Since cable providers increasingly owned or were
affiliated with many of the cable stations they carried, cable providers stood
to benefit from those redirected ad revenues. Thus, the majority held, the
must-carry rules were not intended to differentiate on the basis of content,
but to curtail the anticompetitive practices of the cable industry and to
preserve television for American households that do not subscribe to
cable. '5
Many commentators have criticized the Turner Court's characterization
of the must-carry rules. Charles Fried maintained that the majority
"adopted a mistaken conception of content neutrality."' 56 Another
commentator elaborated, stating:
It is difficult [in light of Congress's explicitly content-based
concerns in structuring the broadcast industry] to imagine that
151. See supra text accompanying note 91.
152. 512 U.S. at 663 (quoting United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 668 n.27
(1972) (plurality opinion)).
153. For a content-neutral regulation to pass constitutional muster, the government's interest
must be "important." Id. at 662 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). A
content-based regulation must advance a "compelling" government interest. Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 130-137.
155. Turner, 512 U.S. at 632-34.
156. Charles Fried, Perfect Freedom, Perfect Justice, 78 B.U. L. REV. 717, 745 (1998).
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Congress would justify the must-carry rules except in part on
grounds that the content of local television is expected
characteristically to differ from that on cable and that this different
content has value.1
57
Another likewise found it implausible that Congress would have sought to
preserve the benefits of broadcast television had it not found the content
those stations disseminated to be valuable. "[U]nless there were some
inherent public value to what [the broadcast] medium provides," she wrote,
"there would be no purpose to government efforts to preserve a particular
medium or to maintain its free availability." '
One of the most forceful critics of the majority's decision was Justice
O'Connor."9 She pointed out that the text of the Cable Act itself
demonstrated that Congress wished to privilege local broadcast stations
because it valued the content they disseminated. For example, in the Act,
Congress extolled the virtues of public broadcast television, stating that it
"provides educational and informational programming to the Nation's
citizens, thereby advancing the Government's compelling interest in
educating its citizens." 160 It referred to public broadcast television as a
"local community institution... that provides public service programming
that is responsive to the needs and interests of the local community." '
6 '
More generally, Congress found that "[b]roadcast television stations
continue to be an important source of local news and public affairs
programming and other local broadcast services critical to an informed
electorate." 62
Congress also asserted that it had a substantial interest in "ensuring that
cable subscribers have access to local noncommercial educational
stations." 163 It is difficult to imagine how Congress could have had a
content-neutral interest in ensuring that cable subscribers had access to
these local broadcast channels. Unlike the households that did not subscribe
to cable, cable subscribers were never in danger of losing access to
television programming altogether. The must-carry rules required cable
providers to devote up to one-third of their channels to broadcast stations,
meaning that broadcasting stations would be in some cases substituted for
cable stations. Thus, for cable subscribers, the must-carry rules affected
157. C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting: Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 57, 60.
158. Gretchen Craft Rubin, Quid Pro Quo: What Broadcasters Really Want, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 686, 695 (1998) (book review).
159. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 674 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 2(a)(8)(A), 106
Stat. 1460, 1461.
161. Id. § 2(a)(8)(B), 106 Stat. at 1461.
162. Id. § 2(a)(1 1), 106 Stat. at 1461.
163. Id. § 2(a)(7), 106 Stat. at 1461 (emphasis added).
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what they watched, but not whether they could watch television at all.
Congress's interest in ensuring that cable subscribers could access
broadcast stations, therefore, seems almost certainly based on the value of
the content disseminated by broadcast stations and the purported interests of
cable subscribers in receiving it."6
Justice O'Connor further pointed out that in some cases the Act
requires the FCC to consider content-based factors in determining whether
a broadcast station should be eligible for must-carry privileges in a
particular market. In particular, the Act requires the FCC to "'afford
particular attention to the value of localism by taking into account such
factors as ... whether any other [eligible station] provides news coverage
of issues of concern to [a] community or provides carriage or coverage of
sporting and other events of interest to the community."'"16 Further, in
determining whether a "low-power" community station is eligible for
must-carry privileges, the Act requires the FCC to ask whether the station
"'would address local news and informational needs which are not being
adequately served by full power television broadcast stations."' 166 These
grants of authority "illustrate the most obvious justification for must-carry
provisions as a whole-to promote local content by safeguarding local
broadcasting." 
167
V. CONGRESS' S EFFORTS To PRESERVE A VISAGE CULTUREL IN AMERICA
The conditions that prompted Congress to enact the must-carry rules in
the United States are analogous to the situation in Canada. Congress found
that local television, which features community voices and perspectives,
was in danger of being overrun by nonlocal television stations on cable.
The problem was not that cable stations did not themselves feature a diverse
set of views and perspectives. What Congress found to be missing was a
particular set of ideas and experiences inherent to the content delivered by
local broadcast stations. Praising local broadcast programming as the
"'linchpin of localism,"' 68 Congress found that commercial broadcast
television provides vital local news and public affairs programming not
164. It is possible that Congress found that broadcast stations make significant contributions
to local economies that would be as valuable to local cable subscribers as noncable subscribers.
Nothing in Congress's findings, however, refers to such nonspeech community impacts of
broadcast stations. In contrast, and as noted above, Congress referred extensively to the value of
the content disseminated by broadcast stations.
165. Turner, 512 U.S. at 677 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(1)(C)(ii) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
166. Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 534(h)(2)(B)).
167. Baker, supra note 157, at 61.
168. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 56 (1992) (quoting Alfred C. Sikes, Remarks Before the
International Radio and Television Society 6 (Sept. 19, 1991)).
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available on national cable stations. 69 Additionally, Congress found that
public broadcast stations, most of which are licensed to state and local
government agencies, public colleges and universities, school districts, and
other public groups, provide many "programs offering outlets for local
cultural and artistic groups." 70 Finally, Congress sought to protect low-
power community broadcast stations 7' because they feature "significant
amounts" of locally produced programming, including foreign-language
programs for local ethnic communities.'72
The Canadian pop culture industries are analogous to the local
broadcast stations that Congress sought to protect.1 73 Canadian magazine
publishers and television stations, while not obligated to do so, tend to
produce more content reflecting the purported unique perspectives and
experiences of Canadians in the same way that American local broadcast
stations feature more content of special interest to their local communities.
Congress feared that the idiosyncratic local dialogue featured on broadcast
stations would be displaced by an onslaught of cable programming from the
rest of the country. Similarly, the Canadian government found that the
inundation of pop culture products from the much larger American market
was a serious economic threat to the Canadian industry. And Congress
responded in much the same way that the Canadian government chose to
address the continual threat posed by non-Canadian popular culture. It
would appear, therefore, that even Americans (or at least American
lawmakers) occasionally find value in shaping the marketplace of ideas to
include pop culture content that reflects the distinctive outlook of a
community.
While the must-carry rules do not influence what Americans watch on
television to the same degree that the Canadian broadcasting and cable rules
influence what Canadians watch, they nevertheless significantly affect local
broadcast carriage on cable. Before those rules were enacted, studies
conducted by the cable industry showed that 205 cable systems-
representing 2.5 million subscribers-did not carry any local broadcast
169. See S. REP. No. 102-92, at 42 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1175; H.R.
REP. No. 102-628, at 56, 69.
170. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 69.
171. In 2001, there were 2200 low power broadcast stations on the air in approximately 1000
con'unit~cs ;-. al! ff, , states. Richard F Wiley, Communications Law in 2001-A New
Environment: Telephone, Broadcast and Cable, in COMMUNICATIONS LAW 359, 408 (PLI
Intellectual Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G-679, 2001).
172. In the Matter of Review of the Commission's Rules Governing the Low Power
Television Service, 9 F.C.C.R. 2555, 2555 (May 19, 1994).
173. I do not mean to suggest that Canadian popular culture as a whole is analogous to the
idiosyncratic mores of a single local American community. To be sure, Canada is composed of
many diverse communities, large and small, each with its own distinguishing characteristics and
associated pop culture influences. My observation is that American local broadcast stations, like
Canadian purveyors of popular culture, were perceived by the federal government as threatened
by outside influences and worthy of protection.
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stations at all."7 Extrapolating from those limited studies, the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation estimated that 1700
cable providers had refused to carry local television stations in 3600
instances. 175 The rules now require that all cable providers with more than
twelve channels devote up to one-third of their total channel capacity to
local commercial television stations that request carriage. 76 Additionally,
cable providers with more than thirty-five channels must carry at least two
low-power "community" stations177 and providers with more than thirty-six
channels must carry all stations within fifty miles classified as "local
noncommercial educational stations." "' As of late 1996, the must-carry
rules mandated that cable stations carry 35,886 local broadcast channels
nationwide. 179 The must-carry rules also have a significant effect in that
they require cable operators to assign a local broadcast station to the same
channel number as that station uses to broadcast over the air.' Finding that
cable providers often shift the placement of local channels on their cable
systems81 and that channel position can be crucial to a broadcast station's
success on a cable system,"' Congress included the channel position
requirement to keep local stations in their "'prime VHF channel slots."'"183
One of the arguments the United States advanced during the magazine
dispute at the WTO was that the Canadian government was entitled to
preserve its cultural industries through direct subsidization. What Canada
was not permitted to do, the United States argued, was to use protectionist
measures that restricted access of American publications to the Canadian
market.'" Interestingly, that same argument could be leveled against the
174. S. REP. No. 102-92, at 43, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1176.
175. Id.
176. 47 U.S.C.A. § 534(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2001).
177. Id. § 534(c)(1)(B).
178. Id. § 535(c), (/)(2)(A). Under § 535(e), however, providers need not carry stations with
programming that "substantially duplicates" that of another "local noncommercial educational
television station." Id. § 535(e).
179. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 249-50 (1997) (O'Connor, I.,
dissenting). Though cable operators claimed that they were already carrying about eighty-five
percent of those broadcast stations, those stations are nevertheless part of those rules' First
Amendment burden, because the rules prevent operators from dropping those broadcast stations
later should more desirable cable stations become available. Id.; cf Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v.
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (holding that a statute requiring a newspaper to publish
specified matter limits speech even if publishing it does not prevent the paper from printing
something else or cause it to incur additional costs).
180. 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(6) (1994).
181. The Senate Committee noted that 974 of the cable systems that had responded to an
FCC survey had admitted that they had shifted the position of local stations in nearly 3000
instances. S. REP. No. 102-92, at 43-44 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133, 1177.
182. H.R. REP. No. 102-628, at 55 (1992).
183. Id. (quoting Cable Television: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 531 (1988)).
184. Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, Report of the Panel, supra note
29, at 497-98,
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must-carry rules. Congress could also have chosen to preserve the local
broadcasting industry using subsidies-and this was, in fact, what Justice
O'Connor suggested in Turner P s5 Like the Canadian government,
however, Congress chose to implement protective rules instead, despite the
greater burdens on speech those rules engendered. When the Turner case
came before the Supreme Court for the second time, the majority
considered the possibility of a system of subsidies as an alternative to the
must-carry rules. Finding that the must-carry rules would be simpler to
administer and would be less likely to require the government to make
content-based determinations about specific programming, the Court held
that Congress had the prerogative to implement the more restrictive
constraint on speech in that case.'86
It is not surprising that the American government argues forcefully for
cultural free trade internationally while at the same time burdening speech
to protect local culture at home. The dominant position of the United States
on the global stage, coupled with the saturation of American life with
American popular culture products, means that few Americans would
seriously consider the presence of foreign works in the United States a
serious threat to sovereignty. It took a threat to local community identity
(ironically from the same American mass culture that threatens cultural
industries in other countries) to smoke out the more nuanced American
view that pop culture works can have a distinct value that transcends free-
market principles.
The must-carry rules thus expose the myth of the United States as a
paragon of cultural free trade. President George W. Bush recently pledged
to "[w]ork to ensure that provisions in trade agreements are compatible
with important domestic policy objectives." '87  Consequently, the
divergence between America's international position on culture and its
domestic protective measures ought to be reconciled. When the next
Canadian cultural controversy arises, rather than adopting the extreme
position that pop culture works are merely ordinary commodities,'88 the
185. She argued:
The interest in localism, either in the dissemination of opinions held by the listeners'
neighbors or in the reporting of events that have to do with the local community, ... is
agtite iterest, perhaps even an important one--certainly the government can
foster it by, for instance, providing subsidies from the public fisc-but it does not rise
to the level necessary to justify content-based speech restrictions.
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
186. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 222 (1997).
187. OFI+CE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LEGISLATIVE AGENDA 5 (2001), http://www.ustr.govlagenda.pdf.
188. During the most recent dispute over Canada's protective rules on periodicals, U.S. Trade
Representative Charlene Barshefsky threatened to retaliate "by withdrawing benefits of
equivalent commercial effect." Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, United
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U.S. Trade Representative should consider the more subtle view Congress
affirmed when it used pop culture discrimination to preserve a visage
culturel in local communities.' 89 Given Congress's appreciation of the
special qualities of pop culture, the USTR should be more willing to
understand and accommodate the efforts of other nations to preserve their
own cultural industries.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note began with three quotations. The first two were extreme
Canadian and American views on the meaning and importance of popular
culture. Margaret Atwood's rhetoric is an exaggerated account of the
Canadian preoccupation with fostering and maintaining an identity that is
self-consciously not American. For Canadians, works of popular culture,
which allow for the exchange of distinctly Canadian views and
perspectives, are integral to building a vibrant Canadian community and
maintaining that non-American identity. The Canadian perspective is
consistent with the Canadian freedom of expression jurisprudence, which
has as one of its core values the promotion of a diversity of ideas in the
public sphere. I argued that the Canadian Supreme Court would likely
uphold the protective cultural measures currently in place for magazines
and cable television for the same reason the Court would uphold a Quebec
sign law that required French to be the "markedly predominant" language
displayed. Since the unfettered importation of foreign pop culture works
would seriously threaten Canadian cultural industries, the Court-in the
interest of diversity-would uphold the Canadian government's attempts to
preserve a place for Canadian works and ideas in a market where foreign
works predominate.
The second quotation, from Mark Fowler of the FCC, is at the same
time accurate and misleading. By comparing televisions to toasters, Fowler
was not articulating the position that expressive commodities are no
different from ordinary consumer goods. After all, if the government
wished to do so, it could regulate the market for toasters extensively with
no constitutional ramifications. This was not the FCC's position at the time;
rather than ratcheting up its level of regulation, it was actively reducing
regulatory constraints on broadcasting and other communications. Instead,
States To Take Trade Action if Canada Enacts Magazine Legislation (Oct. 30, 1998),
http:/Iwww.ustr.govlreleases/1998/1 1/98-96.pdf
189. The USTR is required by statute to consider congressional policies when developing the
executive position in trade negotiations. One formal mechanism for obtaining "advice on the
development of trade policy" is the appointment of five members of the House and five members
of the Senate as "congressional advisers [to the President and the USTR] on trade policy and
negotiations." 19 U.S.C. § 221 i(a)(]) (1994).
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Fowler's comment stands for the underlying American belief that
expressive works belong to a special kind of market, but a market all the
same: Holmes's marketplace of ideas. Current First Amendment doctrine
holds that expressive works are a special type of commodity that the
government may not regulate on the basis of content without a compelling
reason. Influenced by that First Amendment optic, U.S. Trade
Representatives view Canadian protective measures as impermissible
restraints on trade in a market where Americans view restrictions to be
particularly inappropriate. Not surprisingly, the American constitutional
doctrine in this area tracks America's international position-the interest in
ensuring access to a wide range of views from diverse and antagonistic
sources is not compelling enough to justify a content-based restriction on
expression.
Despite that overarching U.S. position, I observed that when works of
popular culture in America's local communities are threatened as Canadian
cultural products are endangered by American imports, the American
position appears to change. Finding that "[t]here is a substantial
government and First Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views
provided through multiple technology media" (the third quotation),
Congress enacted protective must-carry rules. And those rules are in many
ways analogous to the Canadian protective regulations that the United
States so consistently criticizes. The must-carry rules suggest that Congress
does not conceive of pop culture works as mere ordinary goods. Therefore,
instead of arguing for cultural free trade on the international stage while
Congress deviates from those same free-market principles to protect the
works that animate local communities, the U.S. Trade Representative
should acknowledge that Americans appreciate the special value of a
community's visage culturel after all. Hopefully that perspective will enter
the discussion when the next Canadian cultural controversy arises.
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